We study human learning in a individual choice laboratory task called Orange Juice Futures price forecasting OJF, in which subjects must implicitly learn the coe cients of two independent variables in a stationary linear stochastic process. The 99 subjects each forecast in 480 trials with feedback after each trial. Learning is tracked for each subject by tting the forecasts to the independent variables in a rolling regression. Results include: 1 learning is fairly consistent in that coe cient estimates for most subjects converge closely to the objective v alues, but there is a mild general tendency toward over-response. 2 Typically learning is noticeable slower than the Marcet-Sargent ideal. Among the more striking treatment e ects are a general tendency towards 3 over-response with high background noise and 4 under-response with asymmetric coe cients.
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Introduction
Economists in recent years have begun to model how people might learn equilibrium behavior. Microeconomists following Binmore 1987 and Fudenberg and Kreps 1988 consider learning models with roots in Cournot 1838 and Brown 1951 . Numerous laboratory studies test and re ne the microeconomists' learning models; see Camerer 1998 for a recent survey. There is also a separate theoretical macroeconomics literature on learning following Marcet and Sargent 1989a,b,c and Sargent 1994; see Evans and Honkapohja 1997 for a recent survey. Here the focus is on how people might learn to forecast relevant prices, and whether the learning process permits convergence to rational expectations equilibrium. We are not aware of any laboratory work intended to test and re ne the learning models favored by macroeconomists. 1 The work presented below examines human learning in an individual choice laboratory task called Orange Juice Futures price forecasting OJF. The OJF task has a form and complexity similar to the forecasting tasks in macroeconomists' models: subjects must implicitly learn the coe cients of two independent v ariables in a linear stochastic process. We study stationary versions of the OJF task here in order to sharpen the evidence on learning per se, and leave for future work the nonstationary or "self-referential" aspect of the macroeconomists' models that prices are endogenous and perhaps a ected by individuals' learning processes.
The OJF task is based on the observation of Roll 1984 that the price of Florida orange juice futures depends systematically on only two exogenous variables, the local weather hazard and the competing supply from Brazil. The laboratory experiment consists of many independent trials in which human subjects forecast the OJF price after observing values of the two variables. After each trial the subject receives feedback in the form of the "actual" price generated from a linear stochastic model using the observed values of the two variables. We report results for 99 subjects, each 1 We hasten to add that several important laboratory investigations have been inspired by other strands of macroeconomic theory. For example, Van Huyck et al 1997 and related work studies equilibrium convergence in coordination games, and Marimon and Sunder 1994 and related work studies sunspot equilibria in overlapping generations economies. Later in this introduction we discuss three laboratory studies of rational expectations equilibrium. 1 forecasting in 480 trials. Several treatments are varied across subjects, such as the noise amplitude and the relative impact of the two variables.
We are interested in two aspects of learning: consistency and speed. Roughly speaking, learning is consistent to the extent that subjects eventually respond correctly to the exogenous variables, and learning is speedy to the extent that subjects settle quickly into a systematic pattern of response to the variables. To measure learning speed and consistency, we introduce a rolling regression or sequential least squares technique inspired by Marcet and Sargent 1989a,b,c. The technique gives us trial-by-trial estimates of subjects' implicit coe cient values or responsiveness to the two exogenous variables. We deem learning to beconsistent if these estimates converge by the last trial to the objective values, and say that there is under or over response if the absolute values of the coe cients are below or above the objective values. We measure learning speed mainly by comparing a subject's path of coe cient estimates to an ideal Bayesian or Marcet-Sargent path.
The OJF task is a continuous analogue of the discrete response Medical Diagnosis MD task studied intensively by psychologists such as Gluck and Bower 1988 and more recently by Kitzis et. al. 1998. The older psychological literature from Thorndike 1898 emphasizes reinforcement learning actions that do well now are "reinforced" and chosen more frequently in the future. Naive reinforcement models do not extend naturally to our OJF task since it is not clear what reinforcement means in the context of continuous stimuli weather and supply information and continuous response price forecast. The MD literature considers more sophisticated models of error-driven learning, including neural network or connectionist models and generalized discrete Bayesian models. The most striking nding of Kitzis et. al. 1998 is that a generalized Bayesian model outperforms alternative psychological models in the version of the MD task closest to the present OJF task. That paper also justi es reliance on least squares as opposed to maximum likelihood tting techniques. The MD results encourage us to pursue rolling regression techniques in the OJF task.
There is also a related strand of experimental economics literature that examines rational expectations. Garner 1982 presents twelve subjects over 44 periods with a continuous forecasting task that implicitly requires the estimation of seven coe cients in a third order autoregressive linear stochastic model. He rejects stronger versions of rational expectations but nds some predictive power in weaker versions. Williams 1987 nds autocorrelated and adaptive forecast errors by traders in simple asset markets. Dwyer et al 1993 test subjects' forecasts of an exogenous random walk. They nd excess forecast variance but no systematic positive or negative forecast bias.
Section 2 below describes our experiment. Section 3 presents the main results: 1 learning is fairly consistent in that most subjects' coe cient estimates converge closely to the objective v alues but there is a mild general tendency toward over-response. 2 Typically learning is noticably slower than the Marcet-Sargent ideal. Among the more striking treatment e ects are a general tendency 3 towards over-response in the high noise treatment and 4 towards under-response in the asymmetric impact treatment.
Section 4 summarizes the results and discusses implications and extensions. Appendices A and B document the instructions to subjects and the identi cation of unresponsive subjects. Kelley and Friedman 1998 brie y summarize the recent MD results together with preliminary OJF results. Kelley 1998 reports additional OJF results, as described in section 4 below. Subjects are instructed on the general nature of the task but are not speci cally told the functional form or the coe cient values. Subjects are told that the experiment is a learning experience in which the goal is to learn the relationship between information weather and competing supply and the price of OJF. The instructions attached as Appendix A state in nontechnical language that the relationship is stable but subject to random events that are independent across trials. Treatments described in the next subsection are held constant for each subject and are varied across subjects.
Subject Pool. We have tested 99 undergraduates from the University of California at Santa Cruz, most of them from the pool of psychology students who need to ful l a class requirement. Salient cash payments were o ered in one treatment described below.
Apparatus. The experiment uses a graphics computer program written in C++, run on power Macintosh 7500 100 computers with full color monitors. Subjects in four sound dampened isolated testing rooms view controlled events on the monitor screen and respond via clicking the mouse on various icons on the display. See Method. Each trial begins with the graphical presentation of the weather and supply values using two thermometer icons labeled weather hazard and Brazilian supply on the left side of the monitor display as in Figure 1 .1 A. Each thermometer is partially lled in red to indicate the realized value. Except in the no history treatment described below, the subject could also access by clicking Previous Cases icon labelled C in Figure 1 .1 the history of prices in previous trials with similar weather and supply levels, as in Figure  1 .2 D. 2 Subjects enter their forecast each period by moving slide B in Figure  1 .1 up or down within the possible price range. After the price prediction is entered and con rmed, a blue line appears on the slide bar to indicate the actual price in that trial as in Figure 1 .3 E. Except in the no score treatment described below, the score box then appears as in Figure 1 .3 F. 3 After viewing the score box if present the subject advances to the next trial via a mouse click.
Each subject completes 480 self-paced trials. The session is broken into 3 blocks of 160 trials and subjects are permitted ve minute breaks between blocks. Subjects generally nish in less than the allotted two hours. 1998 for a recent discussion of this scoring rule. The box also displays the "expert" score of a forecaster with nothing left to learn, i.e., the score earned by forecasting a 1 x 1t + a 2 x 2t in trial t, using objective values of a i . Subjects, of course, do not observe the expert forecast, just the expert score.
Paid. This treatment di ers from baseline only in that subjects are paid according to their nal scores. Each subject receives a $5.00 show up fee covering the rst 30,000 points of nal cumulative score. Actual nal scores always exceeded 30,000 with the top scores over 37,000. Subjects also receive an additional dollar for each 700 points scored above 30,000. The median payment was about $15.00 with top payments about $16.50. Subjects are told the payment procedures on arrival.
No Score. This treatment di ers from baseline only in that subjects do not have access to the Results or Score box icon and box F. realization, and the average realized price in those previous trials. The box remains on the screen until the subject clicks the OK icon. 3 The score box F displays the subject's score on the current trial and the cumulative score through the current trial. The calculation is explained in section 2. For a given subsequence of trials p t ; x 1t ; x 2t , t = t 0 ; :::; T, we de ne the ideal Bayesian or Least Squares or Marcet-Sargent learner by regressing p t on the independent variables x 1t and x 2t via ordinary least squares OLS. The regression over this subsequence of trials yields coe cient estimates a 1T and a 2T . The subsequences we consider consist of trials 1 to 160, 2 to 161, ... ,320 to 480. Thus we obtain learning curves a 1T and a 2T for T = 160; 161; :::; 480, which can beinterpreted as ideal subjective estimates of the objective v alues a 1 and a 2 . We refer below to these as the M-S learning curves.
We use similar rolling regressions for human subjects. An actual subject may think of the task in various idiosyncratic ways | for example, he may believe that prices are serially correlated or that price is a nonlinear deterministic function of the exogenous variables, despite our instructions to the contrary. Nevertheless, the analyst can summarize the subject's beliefs by seeing how he responds to the current stimuli x it , and can summarize the learning process by seeing how the subject's response changes with experi-ence. Our approach therefore is to reconstruct implicit beliefs using equation 1 and subjects' actual responses.
The reconstruction proceeds as follows. Take the subject's actual forecast c t in trial t as the dependent variable, and run rolling regressions as before on the realized values x it , using a moving window of 160 consecutive trials with the last trial T ranging from 160 to 480. Consistent and speedy learning is indicated by rapid convergence of the coe cient estimates a iT as T increases to the objective values a i . Obstacles to learning are suggested by slow convergence, convergence to some other value which represents over-or under-response, or divergence of the coe cient estimates. Some details may beworth noting brie y. 1 In all the results reported below, the intercept coe cient a 0 is constrained to its objective value of zero. Excluding the intercept doesn't a ect our main results but does it does reduce clutter and improve statistical e ciency. 2 In preliminary work we considered stretchable windows of data running from t = 1 to T, to capture fully the evidence available to the subject or M-S ideal learner in trial T.
However, the entire learning curve then re ects the subject's initial response pattern as well as the recent response pattern. We concluded that learning curves would be more informative when estimated from a moving window that includes only the most recent responses. Of course, the recent responses already incorporate everything the subject has learned since the beginning of the session. 3 Lengthening a non-stretchable moving window reduces standard errors in the coe cient estimates, but also reduces the weight on the most recent responses. After a cursory investigation of preliminary data, we settled on length 160 as a reasonable compromise. Figure 2 represent the learning curves for the highest scoring subject or the subject with the median score in each treatment. The corresponding rolling regressions again had typical R 2 s above 0.90. The rst two panels show moderate but persistent overresponse to current w eather and supply information, with implicit coe cient estimates lying closer to 0.45 than to 0.42 for both subjects in the baseline treatment. The next two panels suggest that the top scoring paid subject is right on target, but the median scorer tends to under-respond slightly. Over-response seems strongest with the top scoring subject in the no history treatment and the two subjects shown in the high noise treatment. The two subjects shown in the asymmetric treatment appear to under-respond in most trials.
To conserve space we do not show the learning curves for the other 87 subjects. Su ce it to say that subjects sometimes over-respond, sometimes under-respond, but typically are fairly close to the objective v alues. Subjects seem to update more slowly than the M-S ideal learner. The rest of this section will test these impressions more systematically. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the scores earned by subjects in each treatment. Forecasts often are quite good; in most treatments the highest score is close to 38,000, only a bit below the Marcet-Sargent ideal. The modal score and the median score usually are not very far behind. Mean scores are usually lower because the lowest scores are much lower, sometimes below 34,000. For comparison, we calculated scores in the baseline treatment for two sorts of zero intelligence agents or non-learners. An agent who always forecasted zero the optimal uninformed forecast would score 34,326 and an agent who always used last period's price as the forecast would earn 30,647.
Distribution of Scores
Closer examination of the raw data raises questions about the motivation of the subjects with lowest scores. We found that these subjects generally stopped responding to the weather and Brazil supply information at some point during the session. Subjects who don't care about performance but seek only to nish quickly can do so by just clicking the "OK" icons in every trial, leaving the price forecast at the default value c = 0 . We identi ed such 8 behavior in 9 of the 99 subjects. Note that unthinking responses of c = 0 will bias the coe cient estimates towards 0, so it is potentially important t o the data analysis to identify such "questionable" behavior. Appendix B lists the questionable subjects and the criteria used to identify them.
Do the treatments systematically a ect performance? Figure 3 suggests that, compared to the baseline treatment, scores may be a bit higher for paid subjects and a bit lower in some of the other treatments. Standard Wilcoxon tests indicate signi cantly lower scores in the asymmetric p-value = 0.002, and high noise p=0.002 treatments, and no signi cant di erence from baseline in the no score p=0.71, and no history p=0.56 treatments. The paid condition produced insigni cantly higher scores than the baseline p=0.15. Figure 4 shows the nal T = 480 distribution of both coe cient estimates by treatment. Overall, the subjects seem to have it about right: the estimates center near the objective value and most of the estimates are not far away. Moreover, most of the outlying estimates are spurious under-responses from the 10 questionable subjects denoted with asterisks *. The distributions seem tighter in the paid treatment than in the baseline, and perhaps a bit more dispersed in the last three treatments. More importantly, there may b e a slight bias towards over-response in the high noise treatment and towards under-response in the asymmetric treatment.
Distribution of Coe cient Estimates.
Further analysis is required to explore these impressions. Table 1 classi es a nal T=480 coe cient estimate as objectively correct if its central 95 con dence interval contains the corresponding nal value from the MarcetSargent simulation. 4 The estimate is classi ed as over-or under-response if the con dence interval lies entirely outside or entirely within the interval from zero to the M-S objective v alue. Overall, a plurality of estimates 71 of them are classi ed as objectively correct, and there are about equal numbers of over-responses 59 and under-responses 48 plus 18 questionables.
The main imbalances arise in the last two treatments. Under-response to the more important variable labelled Brazil Supply in Figure 4 and over-response to the other variable are quite prevalent in the asymmetric treatment. In the high noise treatment, a majority of the non-questionable estimates for both coe cients are classi ed as over-response and none is classi ed as under-response.
The last column of the Table reports Wilcoxon p-values separately for each of the two coe cients in each treatment for the full sample and in parentheses, for the reduced sample that excludes the 9 questionable subjects. In three cases the tests reject at the conventional p=0.05 level in the reduced sample the null hypothesis that the estimates center at the objective v alue, in favor of the following one-sided alternatives. There is signi cant under-response to the Supply variable in the asymmetric treatment p=0.00, and signi cant over-response to both variables in the high noise treatment p=0.02,0.00. There is also marginally signi cant over-response to the Supply variable in the baseline treatment p=0.08. The other cases of apparent under-and over-response do not produce signi cant results in this conservative test.
The impression of tighter distributions in the paid treatment is consistent with signi cant ndings in other experiments Smith and Walker, 1993 but turns out not to be signi cant in our data according to standard parametric and non parametric tests. Of course, the sample size is not large, and it may b e w orth noting that subjects with questionable motivation appeared in the baseline and high noise and asymmetric treatment but not in the paid treatment. Table 1 also reports behavior observed halfway through the session, at T=240. Recall from Figure 2 the impression con rmed in omitted gures for the other subjects that modest but shrinking over-response is quite typical at this point. The Table shows that over-response at the halfway point indeed is somewhat more prevalent than at the end of the session, especially in the paid and high noise treatments.
Summary
Several general conclusions emerge from the data analysis. Our human subjects do not learn as fast as an ideal Bayesian or Marcet-Sargent econometrician, but even at the half-way point T=240 of the experiment, the coe cient estimates indicate that responses are not very far from the mark.
The overall tendency is towards over-response to the current information x 1 and x 2 , but this tendency almost disappears by the end T=480 of the experiment. We conclude that learning in our experiment generally is reasonably rapid and very consistent.
The treatments have modest but detectable impacts. Compared to the baseline condition, fewer subjects in the paid treatment appear to have questionable motivation and the scores and coe cient estimates seem to have tighter distributions. Surprisingly, neither the no score treatment nor the no history treatment signi cantly impaired the the subjects' scores or accuracy of the estimated coe cients. The asymmetric treatment, however, signi cantly lowered scores and pushed subjects signi cantly towards underresponse to the more important information and insigni cantly towards over-response to the less important information. The high noise treatment had the strongest impact: lower scores and over-response to both information variables.
Existing literature can easily give the impression that humans typically make very irrational choices in simple laboratory tasks; see Rabin 1998 for a recent thoughtful survey. In sharp contrast, our human subjects rather quickly learn highly rational behavior in a nontrivial forecasting task. What accounts for the divergent results?
In some ways our experiment makes it di cult for subjects to berational. The task is challenging in that the target variable, price, is stochastic and contingent on two independent variables. Another challenging aspect of our experiment is that we used psychology pool subjects, unpaid in most treatments. Irrational behavior exhibited by such subjects in some tasks disappears when subjects drawn from other pools are o ered salient payments Friedman and Sunder, 1994. With the exception of 9 of 99 subjects whose motivation was questionable, our subjects behaved quite rationally.
But in other ways our experiment gives rationality its best shot. The basic task allows subjects to learn over a relatively long sequence of trials 480 in a stationary environment. Our laboratory setup encourages subjects to draw on relevant i n tuitions about price determination and avoids features that might suggest inappropriate heuristics. The visual interface encourages rapid and unbiased processing of information and feedback. If anything, the interface biases subjects towards under-response, since the default response is 0 and the subject must move the slide up or down from that point. The reduced sample used in some of the data analysis screened out the most egregious cases of default response, but perhaps some slight bias remains 5 . Arguably our setup is more representative of economically important eld environments than the some of the setups used in laboratory studies that nd irrational behavior. The rational behavior is fairly robust. Performance was not signi cantly impaired in the no score and no history treatments, which eliminated useful feedback. Even in the asymmetric and high noise treatments, performance was still quite good. Kelley 1998 reports several additional robustness checks. Speci cations designed to capture prior beliefs and non-linear responses detected some transient e ects in many subjects, but for the most part these e ects disappeared by the nal trial. Tests allowing a non-zero intercept term a 0 for the asymmetric weights treatment w ere also performed.
The main e ect of this additional parameter was to eliminate the marginally signi cant o verresponse observed for the smaller stimuli. The underresponse observed for the larger stimuli remained signi cant. Responses remained fairly rational even in a treatment featuring a structural break.
An important extension of the work presented here, especially from the macroeconomics point of view, is to introduce self-referential price determination. Marcet and Sargent 1989abc study several linear stochastic models where traders' expectations a ect the actual price observed each period. They derive conditions on traders' learning processes rolling regressions in essence that ensure convergence of actual price to rational expectations equilibrium. It seems feasible to implement such economies in the laboratory and given some stronger assumptions than needed in the present paper to extract estimates of subjects' learning processes. We conjecture that the empirical models introduced in the present paper will continue to do well in a more complex self-referential setting.
We see two main lessons in the present results. The discussion so far has emphasized the lesson that people can learn to make quite good forecasts. The other lesson is that some slight but systematic biases remain. In particular, even after 480 trials, subjects still tended to over-respond to news in the high noise environment. Slight individual biases might interact to produce economically important market biases Akerlof and Yellen, 1985; Kelley, 1998 . More theoretical and empirical work is needed to understand learning in self-referential, nonstationary environments. 
GENERAL INFORMATION
In this experiment you will be asked to use information to make predictions. You will look at information on competing supply levels and on weather hazard and will predict orange juice futures prices. Orange juice price determination in this experiment is ctitious but basically similar to real life. Your job is similar to that of an investor who must use imperfect information to predict futures prices.
In Each piece of information can take on a value from 0 to 100. A value of 0 for weather hazard means that there will be no loss of local production due to inclement w eather and a value of 100 means likely massive damage to the local crop. Similarly, a value of 0 for supply means a very small Brazilian production and a value of 100 means the largest possible Brazilian crop.
Each period after viewing the information on weather and supply, you will enter your price prediction. Prices are measured within the range -100 all the way 'DOWN', or 100 cents below the normal level to +100 all the way 'UP' or 100 cents above the normal level. For example, sliding the box see Figure 1 .1, B to the topmost 'UP' position indicates that you believe that the current supply and weather conditions will result in a price 100 cents above the normal price. Likewise sliding the best guess box to the bottommost 'DOWN' position indicates that you believe the current crop conditions imply a price 100 cents below the normal price. Moving the box halfway uphalfway down between the middle and topbottom predicts a price 50 cents price abovebelow the normal level. Leaving the best guess box at its original position predicts exactly the normal price level. For example see Figure 1 .2, D, the current harvest's low w eather hazard of 7 was associated with a price 35 cents below normal, and the somewhat high competing supply 69 was associated with a price 18 cents below normal. Click O.K. to leave the Previous Cases window.
READING CHARTS
After you have considered the relevant information, you enter your forecast by clicking the slide box and moving it to your chosen location on the ruler. After you have made your prediction the UP or DOWN box will be darkened if you predict a price di erent from the normal level, otherwise they will both remain light. Click on OK to submit your forecast. You will then be told the actual price that period. A blue bar will appear on the ruler to indicate the actual price see Figure 1. 3, E. You may then be given a numerical score for your prediction this harvest and a cumulative score for all harvests to date see Figure 1 .3, F. You will then get the information chart for the next period.
Your goal is to predict as accurately as possible each period. There will be many periods for you to predict. Work at your own pace. The whole experiment should take less than 2 hours. We ask that you do not take notes. SCORING Your score is the pro t an investor makes when acting on your price prediction. Each harvest you earn points based on your prediction between -100 and 100 and the actual price that harvest. Pro t is higher the more accurate your forecast.see Figure 1 .3, F For example if the actual price turns out to be 70 cents above normal, then your score is highest if your prediction was +70, a bit lower if your prediction was +60 or +80 and much 18 lower if you predicted 0 or below.
USEFUL FACTS ABOUT PRICES IN THIS EXPERIMENT
You should not expect your forecasts to beexactly correct each period. The same supply and weather conditions can sometimes lead to a price increase and sometimes to a price decrease relative to the normal level. But if you properly use the average e ects of weather and competing supply, your forecasts will usually be fairly accurate.
Each harvest period researchers collect available information about market conditions a ecting orange juice. The information is distilled into the charts you see. The charts always record the available information correctly. The two pieces of information are independent in the sense that, for example, a high local weather hazard does not indicate a high or low Brazilian supply.
Each piece of information tends to be associated with higher or lower prices, but there is never certainty. An expert who completely understands the e ects of competing supply and weather hazards typically earns much higher pro ts than a novice, but even the expert can't predict perfectly each period.
Feel free to ask the experimenter about anything in these instructions or in the experiment that is unclear to you.
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Appendix B: Identity of Questionable Subjects.
The reduced sample omits 9 of the 99 subjects. The omitted 9 usually earned the lowest scores in their particular treatment group. The criterion for omission was whether the subject actually responded to the stimuli, or always entered the default continuous response of 0 corresponding to a normal price forecast, or no expected price change in many consecutive trials. Here are the speci cs. 
